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Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in 
repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to 
the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier 
psychologists' experiments show some tendency to convergence. Our rivalling learning rule, a 
modification of win-stay lose-change, does predict convergence. We perform an experiment using 
modern economic methodology and compare these two learning rules. Our results are 
unfavourable for both reinforcement learning as well as win-stay lose-change. The data rather 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decades literature on learning in games has been growing fast. While in 
the early stages of research on learning focus has been laid on the justification of equilibria 
(see Brown 1951, Robinson 1951), during the last years learning rules have increasingly been 
applied to predict individual behaviour (see Crawford 1995, van Huyck et al. 1996, 
Mookherjee and Sopher 1997, Erev and Rapoport 1998, Tang 1998, and many more). 
Notably, learning theories of limited cognitive sophistication have been quite successful in 
predicting individual behaviour (see especially the reinforcement model of Roth and Erev 
1995, and Erev and Roth 1998)
1, even though players in experiments were given much more 
information than actually being used by these theories. Alternative learning theories that make 
use of more information, such as fictitious play
2, have regularly been outperformed (see for 
example Roth and Erev 1995, Mookherjee and Sopher 1997, Camerer and Ho 1999). These 
results confirmed Smith’s (1990) early conjecture that individuals rigorously select among 
pieces of information given to them and specified the most relevant piece of feedback to be 
the own payoff
3.  
There are only few experimental studies that deal with environments in which the own 
payoff from the last interaction is the only feedback individuals get. The results from these 
studies are mixed. Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), for example, notice that in a game 
involving a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium subjects are showing much more inertia when 
feedback about the opponent’s performance is lacking. Nagel and Vriend (1997) show that in 
a fairly complex situation subjects adhere to a simple directional learning scheme. Van Huyck 
et al. (1996) find that in a coordination game with a large strategy space fictitious play does a 
better job in predicting the speed of convergence than does reinforcement learning, although 
subjects did not have enough information to perform fictitious play.  
Our purpose is to investigate, whether reinforcement learning is able to make good 
predictions of individual behaviour in a most favourable setting. We take one of the simplest 
possible social games and impose a minimal informational setting which allows subjects to 
act according to this learning scheme. In section 2 we present the game and discuss previous 
results from psychological experiments. Also in section 2 we present results from simulations 
                                                        
1 However, the opposite result has been found in van Huyck et al. (1996) and Cheung and Friedman (1997).  
2 Fictitious play has originally been introduced by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). It has extensively been 
discussed in Fudenberg and Levine (1998).  
3 There are quite some studies, however, that also show that feedback on actions or payoffs of the opponents 
have significant impact on one’s own actions, too. See for example, Huck et al. (1998, 1999) and Duffy and   3
that indicate that reinforcement learning seems to predict different behaviour than observed in 
the earlier studies. Therefore, we also present an alternative learning sch eme that seems to 
perform better in accounting for the results.  
Section 3 is devoted to the experiment design, while section 4 presents and discusses the 
data. We will see that behaviour in our experiment differs from what has been observed in 
psychological studies. Furthermore, none of the learning schemes successfully describes all 
broad qualitative features of actual behaviour. The general result is that subject’s play is much 
more complex than can reasonably be traced by simple adaptive learning schemes. For this 
reason the game of mutual fate control provides an environment in which simple dynamics 
would lead to efficiency, but subjects are handicapped by the complexity of their own 
thoughts. We discuss our results and conclude in section 5. Appendix  7.1 contains the 
instructions given to the subjects (translated from German), and appendix  7.2 shows all 
observations. Finally, appendix  7.3 gives detailed information on the accordance to the 
experimentation learning scheme.  
2. Game and predictions 
In this section we will present the game that has been termed mutual fate control (Thibaut 
and Kelley (1959)). The first subsection will discuss its general characteristics. In the next 
two subsections we will show that reinforcement learning and experimentation learning make 
two distinct predictions for long-run play.  
We tried to find a game from which we can expect learning theories to be particularly 
easy to distinguish. We considered all 2x2-games that involve only two possible payoff 
values, i.e. either 0 or 1. The most interesting game that we were left with and which suffices 
to make distinct predictions for different learning schemes was the game known as mutual 
fate control. Psychologists are more familiar with this game than are economists, since it 
served as the basic game representing a minimal social situation, i.e. one of the simplest 
situations in which at least two persons are involved and in which at least one strategy of one 
player affects the payoff of at least one other player, possibly without being aware of this. 
However, even psychological experiments date back as far as 1981 with the peak of interest 
having been during the early 60s. This is why we decided, first, to replicate the experiment in 
modern style, using current economic experimental methodology, and second, to describe the 
game in more detail in the next subsection. We also give a brief survey of the psychological 
results. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Feltovich (1997). However, there have opposing results been presented, too (Bosch-Domènech and Vriend 
1999).    4
2.1   The game 
The game under consideration is an extremely simple 2x2 game with payoffs being either 
0 or 1. The essence of the game is that each player’s payoff is solely determined by the action 
taken by the opponent. In our simple 2-value 2x2 version this means that each player decides 
upon whether to give 0 or 1 to the other player. The resulting payoff bimatrix is shown in 
Table 1.  
    player 2 
    A  B 
0    1   
A 
  0    0 


















Table 1: mutual fate control  
An extension to continuous strategy spaces is straightforward. For three reasons we 
deliberately chose the simplest version of this game. First, we wanted to avoid possible 
sampling processes due to the complexity of the strategy space. Second, in a more simple 
game it is most likely that the underlying structure of the game is quickly revealed by 
repeated play. And third, by this design we can rule out endogenous aspiration levels that may 
arise from the exploration of a larger strategy space
4. As can easily be seen, under complete 
information any mixed-strategy profile is a weak Nash-equilibrium. People are, hence, faced 
with an extreme multitude of equilibria. However, since there is only one efficient cell (which 
also gives the same payoff to both players) any motivational theory will suggest that 
individuals will prefer this cell (B,B)
5.  
With uncertainty about the payoffs, however, the underlying payoff structure has first to 
be investigated in order to be able to coordinate on cell (B,B). Since no information of either 
actions or payoffs of the opponent is given to the players, coordination has to emerge silently, 
i.e. individual calculus does not suffice for coordination, while joint action can lead to 
efficiency. In the next two subsections we show that both, divergence as well as silent 
coordination, is possible under different individualistic learning rules.  
In earlier experimental investigations, psychologists have found strong evidence in favour 
of successful cooperation (Sidowski et al. 1956, Sidowski  1957, Kelley et al. 1962, 
                                                        
4 Inclusion of endogenous aspiration levels may cause learning to have distinctly different characteristics. See 
Börger and Sarin (1997).  
5 We consider it as highly improbable that people exhibit so much spite as to deliberately harm the opponent and 
to run the risk of immediate retaliation, thereby giving up the jointly and individually efficient outcome.    5
Rabinowitz et al. 1966, and Arickx and Van Avermaet 1981). The authors report that usually, 
coordination after 100 rounds of repeated play was reached to approximately 75 per cent. 
However, they usually did not tell the subjects that they were actually playing a 2-person 
game
6, and second, incentives were generally non-monetary; instead, electric shocks provided 
negative payoffs while points (not converted into money) provided positive incentives.  
In more detail, Sidowski et al. (1956) first conducted mutual fate control under a free-
timing scheme, i.e. subjects could choose among strategies at any time they wanted. The 
result of each choice was immediately forwarded to the opponent. The common observation 
was that cooperative play rose gradually over time, despite of players not being aware of 
participating in a social environment. Sidowski (1957) replicated this finding.  
Experiments by Kelley et al. (1962) showed that the timing scheme seems to be crucial. 
They found that mutual fate control leads to successful cooperation if responses are made 
simultaneously, but cooperation does not evolve if responses have to be made in alternating 
order, i.e. the outcome of one player’s response is showed to the other player before he is 
allowed to do his own choice. Kelley et al. argue that cooperation is the result of a win-stay 
lose-change learning scheme, which is successful in a simultaneous-move environment (or an 
environment in which simultaneous moves are frequent), but yields misleading incentives in 
an alternating-move environment. Furthermore, from individual behaviour Kelley et al. found 
that the win-stay part of the learning scheme is strong while the lose-change part cannot be 
confirmed. Rabinowitz et al. (1966) report confirming results from similar experiments on 
mutual fate control and a variant, termed fate control – behaviour control, by using a framing 
in which subjects’ choices were presented as predictions of a bivariate random variable and 
the other players’ responses were presented as successes or failures.  
From the point of view of today’s accepted methodology all experiments suffer from 
severe shortcomings. First, the early ones gave incentives to opponents to maximise one’s 
own positive payoffs (points), while negative payoffs (electric shocks) were seen as negative 
stimuli per se. Given the fixed time limit (usually five minutes) and no restrictions on the 
speed of responses, people tended to hit the buttons as often as possible, yielding response 
frequencies of several hundred times within the time interval of up to five minutes. Second, 
response frequencies were recorded “on-the-fly”, i.e. every 30 seconds the experimenter had 
to take down four numbers, representing the four responses of the two subjects, 
simultaneously. At the given response speed this task was certainly lacking accuracy. Third, 
because of the free timing scheme it is not credible that subjects were not aware of interacting 
                                                        
6 So subjects had the idea of playing against a two-armed bandit.    6
in a social environment. People must have quickly found out that no random variable was 
determining their responses but a human person, even more so because, at that time, 
electronic techniques were not very much advanced.  
The problem of making subjects believe that they do not interact with other subjects was 
not solved by introducing simultaneous or alternating moves, because there is no reason to 
control for the timing of responses other than coordinating responses with responses of other 
subjects
7. However, the controlled schemes allowed for more detailed individual analyses and 
are much closer to today’s experimental practice in economics. We basically build on the 
simultaneous-move experiment by Rabinowitz et al. (1966) with some modifications that 
make our experiment adhere to current experimental designs in economics. Especially, we do 
not try to conceal the social interaction. Instead, we tell subjects in advance that they are 
going to play a two-person game. Furthermore, we give true monetary incentives by paying 
subjects according to their payoffs gathered during play. Finally, we took great care to make 
interaction anonymous, so persons, first, cannot make use of known personal characteristics 
of their opponent, second, communication during play is not possible, and third, personal 
attitudes towards their opponent do not play a role.  
2.2  Reinforcement learning 
The results from former experiments on the simultaneous-move mutual fate control game 
are quite favourable for the prediction that eventual cooperation is quite probable. We now 
check whether reinforcement learning, the most prominent and most successful learning 
scheme that is applicable to the given low-information environment yields the same 
predictions. We describe the reinforcement model as has been introduced by Roth and Erev 
(1995)
8.  
The starting point is to think of probabilities of choices being the normalised inclination 
to choose a certain strategy. This tendency to play a strategy is determined by the 
accumulation of past payoffs from choosing that strategy. In formal terms we say that  ( ) t p
i
j  is 
the propensity of player i to play strategy j at time t. The initial propensity  ( ) 0
i
j p  has to be 
determined either by fixing it in advance, or by estimating the value. Let  ( ) t
i p  be the payoff 
                                                        
7 The only experiment to fulfil the assumption of a minimal social situation were the experiments by Arickx and 
van Avermaet (1981). They replicated the experiment by Rabinowitz et al. by using a programmed opponent 
who responded according to the Cross (1973) dynamic. 
8 Psychologists have discussed reinforcement learning long before economists have taken it up for their own 
purposes. The first description in economic terms has been made by Cross (1973), though his model was slightly 
different from the one by Roth and Erev (1995).    7
to player i at period t and  ( ) t a
i  be the action chosen. Then the updating of the propensities 
follows 
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with  j > 0 being the forgetting parameter
9. The probability of strategy  j being chosen by 
player i at time t is then given by 
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Then the action by player i at period t is determined by  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) t Z t a
i i s =  
where Z(s) is a random variable with distribution  s.  
In order to present the characteristics of reinforcement learning in our particular game we 
proceed in the following way. First, in order to get an idea of how reinforcement learning 
behaves in the long-run we present results from simulations after 1000 ro unds of play. We 
then compare these results with simulations of 100 rounds. We will see that results from the 
two time-horizons differ only with respect to a certain range of the value for the forgetting 
parameter j.  
One of the most prominent features of reinforcement learning is the adherence to the  law 
of effect. Roughly, this effect states that learning is fast at the beginning of play and gradually 
diminishes as time proceeds. For our 2x2 game this means that after an initial phase of rapid 
adjustment  subjects will slowly settle to some mixed-strategy profile. As we see from 
simulations this process results in extremely diverse strategy profiles covering almost all of 
the set of mixed strategies.  Figure  1 depicts 10000 profiles resulting from 1000 periods of 
repeated play by reinforcement learners. We set initial propensities equal to 1 for each 
strategy and each player and  j = 1. Each dot of the figure represents the probability of either 
player to play strategy A in the 1001
st period.  
                                                        
9 See Roth end Erev (1995) for a discussion of this parameter.    8
 




A s ) with reinforcement learners 
We see that our virtual subjects have a slight tendency to either move to the efficient state 
(0,0) or to remain near the Pareto-worst state (1,1). However, even after 1000 rounds 
behaviour is extremely diverse.   
Things change when considering forgetting, i.e. when  j < 1. We summarise our findings 
from simulations of long -run behaviour (i.e. the resulting choic e probabilities after 1000 
rounds) in  Table 2. For convenience we classify choice probabilities in those with  A s  » 0, 
A s  » 0.5, and  A s  » 1, where  A s  denotes the probability to play strategy A. What cannot be 
seen from the table is that for any value  j < 1 the classifications are very precise, i.e. the 
virtual subjects eventually converge to either of the classes. For  j = 1 we get the diverse 
picture as illustrated in  Figure 1
10.  
profile  j = 0.1  j = 0.5  j = 0.9  j = 0.95  j = 0.99  j = 1 
(0,0)  3.6  17.0  32.6  32.1  25.0  22.7 
(0,0.5)  58.9  35.7  4.7  3.8  7.7  16.5 
(0.5,0.5)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.7  12.7 
(0,1)  3.7  15.3  29.3  30.3  17.3  8.4 
(0.5,1)  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.0  24.1  23.4 
(1,1)  33.8  32.0  33.4  30.8  18.2  16.3 
Table 2: long-run profile classification (in per cent) for reinforcement learning; 
1000 simulations with 1000 rounds each  
                                                        
10 For the case j = 1 it is important to know that the boundaries of the classes were defined at 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 
1.    9
From Table 2 we can infer that probability distributions of states show highly non -linear 
dependence on the forgetting parameter j. The most important characteristics to be observed 
are (i) that the probability of the efficient state (0,0) to be approached never exceeds 33 
percent, and (ii) that profiles in which at least one player mixes with 50 percent probability 
look rather unstable, so they can survive after 1000 rounds only if forgetting is small enough.  
Simulations on the period of time that was actually being  played in the laboratory (i.e. 
100 rounds) is shown in  Table 3. The basic result from this analysis is that after 100 rounds 
things are not much different from what they are in the long run, unless the forgetting 
parameter j is not close to 1. However, from earlier analyses we may expect j to lie within 
this region (see for example Camerer and Ho 1999). In this case we can see that in the shorter 
term strategies with mixing behaviour of at least one of the participants are more li kely to 
occur than in the long-run.  
profile  j = 0.1  j = 0.5  j = 0.9  j = 0.95  j = 0.99  j = 1 
(0,0)  3.8  19.0  31.6  27.7  20.9  18.2 
(0,0.5)  60.4  35.0  8.4  7.5  15.8  19.0 
(0.5,0.5)  0.0  0.0  0.2  2.7  13.7  14.2 
(0,1)  3.2  15.9  19.5  15.9  9.7  8.2 
(0.5,1)  0.0  0.0  9.6  22.3  24.1  25.3 
(1,1)  32.6  30.1  30.7  23.9  15.8  15.1 
Table 3: short-run profile classification (in per cent) for reinforcement learning; 
1000 simulations with 100 rounds each 
2.3  Experimentation learning 
Since reinforcement learning i s not quite satisfying as to the behaviour that can be 
expected from the results of earlier studies we next present a learning rule that is purely based 
on experimentation behaviour. We are unaware of any former formulation of this rule, though 
it bares resemblance to the search-and-select adaptation rule proposed by Conlisk (1993). It 
may also be interpreted as a variant of the win -stay lose-change learning scheme, whereby the 
win-stay part is slightly generalised and the lose -change part is transformed in to a lose-
randomise scheme.  
The idea of this rule is to let individuals, first, gather information about payoff and then 
decide upon which action to take, based on a fixed number of previous payoff experiences 
with each strategy. In more detail, we assume each player to record the feedback returned 
after playing a strategy and keep only the last  m pieces of feedback information for each 
strategy. In case the record for one strategy is unambiguously favourable then this strategy   10
will be chosen with a fixed  probability x. In case no action or both actions have a perfect 
record, the action chosen in the next period is determined according to a random process 
giving equal probability to each possible strategy.   
There are several different ways to assess the goodness of a strategy record. Since we 
want to apply our learning rule to a particularly simple game we do not bother to formulate a 
complicated evaluation scheme. In the game to be described, the only payoffs that possibly 
arise from choosing an action are  either 0 or 1 (and people are informed of that prior to 
playing the game). This simplicity allows us to formulate a rudimentary evaluation scheme 
based on a fixed aspiration level. The aspiration level is given by the payoff 1. Hence, if the 
payoff of the action is 0 we record dissatisfaction (or failure), and if the payoff of an action 
turns out to be 1 we record satisfaction (or success).  
We will concentrate on a 2-person game. Players are denoted by  { } 2 , 1 ˛ i . The number 
N m˛  denotes the size of the memory of a player. For the later estimation we restrict  m to be 
equal for all players, though for the theory we might as well allow it to vary between 
individuals. Our notion of the size of the memory  m is used differently to usual definitions of 
bounded history, as for example in Hon-Snir et al. (1998) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 
1991). While bounded history is defined as capturing all payoff feedback dating back  m 
periods before the current period, we consider the player  to trace all m last actions of each 
strategy separately. Particularly, if a strategy has not been chosen for a long period of time, 
then even experience gathered in the distant past is relevant for the current choice. This model 
is related to the view that memory is not simply forgotten, but rather selectively overwritten 
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i
j t t ,  in which strategy  j has 
been chosen by player i for the t
th time (t ‡ m). The value of the evaluation  ( ) t e
i
j  is given by 1 
if the payoff for player  i resulting from playing strategy  j in period  t has been equal to 1
11, 
otherwise it is 0.  
The experimentation learning is now defined to accord to the following rule:  
                                                        
11 More generally, we may define the value of  ) (t e
i
j
 as a success (i.e. equal to 1) whenever the resulting payoff 
from playing strategy j has been bigger or equal to player i’s aspiration level a
i, and we fix a
i = 1 for all players 
i. For the present study it is not necessary to further model aspiration levels. A generalisation for more complex 
payoff spaces as has been done by Börgers and Sarin (1997) for the Cross model can easily be applied.     11
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whereby 1j denotes the vector with all entries being 0 except at the j
th entry which is 1 and 1 -j 
being the complementary vector. 
m 1  denotes the  m-tuple consisting entirely of ones, and 
( ) s Z  again being the random variable with distribution  s.  
A very interesting extreme case is x = 1, i.e. experimentation with equal probability until 
one strategy gets a full record. The crucial property of this learning process is that play among 
two players following this process eventually converges to the efficient state. The reason for 
this is simply that random play by both players will never cause both players to commit to 
some pure strategy simultaneously, unless both players have a record with complete 
successes. Under the 2x2 mutual fate control game thi s is only possible if both players have 
reached the state at which they are playing strategy B with certainty. Furthermore, since 
probability distributions under non -commitment are assumed to stay fixed over time and to 
have full support, the outcome (B,B) will eventually occur with probability 1
12.  
For illustration we ran simulations with x = 1 in order to assess the distribution of the 
probability of convergence over time. Probabilities of convergence strongly depend on the 
size m of memory. Figure 2 shows the cumulated distributions of date of convergence. They 
are composed of 10000 simulations for each  { } 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 ˛ m .  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of convergence for experimentation learning  
Not surprisingly, convergence quickly shifts to the later rounds as  m increases. We will 
have to bear this in mind when interpreting our data. However, for  m £ 3 convergence until 
period 100 is quite likely.  
                                                        
12 From the point of view of Markov Chains the argument is that the state, at which both players have a full 
success record for strategy B, is the only absorbing state of the game.    12
3. Experimental procedure 
The experiment was conducted in four sessions at the MaxLab
13. In each session 8 to 10 
subjects, most of them business and economics students at various levels, were randomly 
allocated to computer terminals, which were separated by mobile cardboard devices. By 
internal computer assignmen t subjects were then randomly matched to pairs. A custom made 
computer program, written in Java, helped to make decisions conveniently and to view all 
information gathered during play. There were 17 pairs (34 subjects) participating in the 
experiments. Below we describe which information was given.   
Each pair played 100 repetitions of the stage game shown in  Table  1. Players did not 
receive any fixed amount of money for participation. Instead, their entire payoff was 
determined during the game. A payoff of 0 lab dollars was converted into 0 Deutsche Mark 
and a payoff of 1 lab dollar was converted into 0.30 Deutsche Mark. Participants were paid at 
the end of the experimental session, whereby fractions of Deutsche Marks were rounded t o 
the next higher integer. So minimum and maximum payoffs that could be earned were 0 
Deutsche Mark and 30 Deutsche Mark, respectively. On average subjects earned 18.25 
Deutsche Mark, whilst a session lasted for 45 to 60 minutes. However, large differences  
between individual total payoffs indicate that considerable payoff incentives were given. The 
maximum total payoff was 30 Deutsche Mark, while the minimum total payoff was only 2 
Deutsche Mark.  
In contrast to many psychological experiments we followed th e economic convention to 
inform subjects, before starting to play, about them being involved in a two -person game. We 
did this mainly in order to avoid uncontrolled beliefs on part of the subjects about the 
interaction they are going to participate in. Fur thermore, this keeps consistency with almost 
all economic experiments. After that, subjects were also told that each participant got the 
same instructions. Furthermore, subjects knew about playing a game in a pair with an 
opponent staying fixed for the entire duration of the experiment. They knew that they would 
never get any information about their opponent, neither his payoffs, nor his choices, nor his 
identity.  
The information about the payoff structure of the game was minimal. Subjects were left 
ignorant about the entries of the payoff matrix. However, the instructions clearly indicated 
that payoffs were calculated with reference to a payoff table that remained fixed over time. 
                                                        
13 The Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory, Germany.     13
Furthermore, it was common knowledge that payoffs for any strategy combinati on of a pair 
could take on either of the two values, 0 or 1
14.  
4. Data analysis 
4.1  Summary statistics 
Average choice frequencies, at first sight, seem to be in line with the former findings of 
the psychological literature. As  Figure 3 shows, the 10-period moving average of the rate of 
B-moves shows a slight upward trend over time, while choices obviously contain a large 
amount of variance. This is confirmed by a simple linear regression of mean choices on time, 
where the coefficient for the time variable is positive and significant to the 1% -level. The rate 
starts at roundabout 54% and approximates roughly 66% towards the end. Final coordination 
is not as high as in Kelley et al. (1962), but it is considerably more than the benchmark case  of 
complete randomisation, i.e. 50%. So far, it looks like slow adjustment process and gradual 
awareness of the coordination scheme are confirmed by the data. Below, we will see that both 
conjectures are falsified by the structure of individual play.  
 
Figure 3: 10-period moving average of rate of B-moves  
(all players) 
We start our more detailed analysis by having a look at the number of pairs that show 
successful coordination: seven pairs (pairs 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 16, and 17) event ually coordinate to 
the efficient cell while ten pairs fail to do so. This is a clear rejection of the hypothesis that 
people use experimentation learning with high x and low memory (i.e. m  £ 3)
15. The rate of 
successful coordination is simply too low. Furthermore, a similar rate of convergence is what 
has been expected by reinforcement learning with slight forgetting (i.e.  j = 0.9). 
                                                        
14 Instructions are given in appendix 7.1.  
15 In their corresponding treatment Rabinowitz et al. (1966) find less complete coordination. The number of 
coordinating pairs was 3 out of 19. However, in a slightly different experiment Kelley et al. (1962)  had 
coordination rates similar to ours, namely 11 out of 30 pairs in a first experiment and 12 out of 22 pairs in a 
second experiment.    14
A closer look at those pairs, which eventually coordinate on playing the efficient cell, 
again draws a different picture. Five  of the seven pairs agree on playing the efficient profile 
(B,B) no later than the ninth round (pairs 2, 9, 10, 13, and 17). One pair starts playing (B,B) 
as late as round 65 (pair 3), while only one pair shows a gradual adjustment towards the 
efficient cell. From this, we may infer that a slow adjustment process, as is predicted by 
reinforcement learning, is not typical of actual play. Having another look at the one pair that 
converges rather late in the game we find that a subtle harmony in choices, assum edly born 
out of pure chance, preceded convergence. The sequence of actions from round 58 to 65 was 
(B,A), (A,A), (A,A), (B,B), (A,A), (B,B), (A,A), (B,B), on which (B,B) followed thereafter. 
And even in pair 16 which does not show any explicit point of co nvergence B-play seems to 
have come up rather suddenly. This can be seen from  Figure  4 which shows the empirical 
frequencies of choices as a moving average of 10 rounds for each player. Hence, in case pairs 
do converge, we find hardly any evidence for slow adjustment behaviour as is predicted by 
reinforcement learning.     15
 
Figure 4: individual 10-round moving averages of B-frequencies 
In fact, slow adjustment can neither be found in those pai rs that did not converge. As can 
be seen from  Figure  4, behaviour is rather volatile over time, within subjects and across 
subjects. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 5, for eight out of the ten pairs that do not 
converge to the efficient outcome, empirical frequencies over all periods show a tendency   16
towards equal frequency for either strategy. This is contrary to what we observed in our 
simulations on reinforcement learning in section  2.2.    17
 
Figure 5: individual average choice frequencies over time 
We can see this also by taking  Figure  3 and removing the decisions made by those 
fourteen players who eventually coordinate with their partners, leaving us with the 10 -period 
moving average of the rate of B-moves over time only for those players who do not 
eventually coordinate with their partners. This is shown in  Figure 6. The same simple linear 
regression as before now tells us that the coefficient for the period variable is positive but so 
small (as compared to its variance) that significance cannot be established even to the 10% -
level.  
 
Figure 6: 10-period moving average of rate of B-moves  
(only players in non co-ordinating pairs) 
Finally, we checked for the accordance to the experimentation learning scheme. For each 
memory size m we computed the rates at which strategies were kept after having a full rec ord   18
of confirmations and the rates at which strategies were changed when the record was 
ambiguous, i.e. contained at least one failure. These rates for each strategy as well as for both 
strategies are depicted in Table 4. According to the experimentation learning scheme with x = 
1, we expect staying when the record is full of confirmations to occur with probability 1 and 
changing when the record is ambiguous to occur with probability 0.5. Note that for  m = 1 we 
can directly compare behaviour with the win-stay lose-change strategy which has, as yet, been 
proposed to account best for behaviour in the mutual fate control game (see Kelley et al. 
(1962) and Rabinowitz et al. (1966))
16. As in the experimental learning scheme, the win -stay 
lose-change scheme would predict a win-stay rate of 1. However, the lose-change rate would 
also be predicted to be 1.  
Dynamic  response  m=1  m=2  m=3  m=4 
full record-stay rate  both  0.63  0.63  0.57  0.54 
ambiguous record-change rate  both  0.42  0.40  0.40  0.40 
full record-stay rate  A  0.65  0.65  0.60  0.62 
full record-stay rate  B  0.47  0.52  0.44  0.29 
ambiguous record-change rate  A  0.42  0.41  0.40  0.40 
ambiguous record-change rate  B  0.45  0.44  0.44  0.44 
Table 4: accordance with response dynamics of experimentation learning  
(averages over all subjects in non coordinating pairs) 
From the figures for both responses taken together we clearly see that players are far from 
according to experimentation learning. Best approximation is reached for  m = 1 and m = 2, 
while higher values for  m seem to predict even worse. In line with earlier observations, we 
find that staying with a strategy after it has been confirmed is much more likely than changing 
one’s strategy after failure. However, contrary to former studies, changing after failure occurs 
with considerably lower frequency than 0.5, which is a complete rejection of the lose -change 
prediction and is even significantly lower than predicted by random play
17. Furthermore, for 
m = 1 and m = 2, the sum of the first two rows only marginally exceeds 1 which indicates that 
staying and changing behaviour is almost independent of whether the strategy’s record is 
confirmatory or not. We conclude that our subjects show a significant amount of inertia, but 
the amount of inertia is almost independent of whether strategies have a confirmatory record 
or not.  
                                                        
16 Note that in the mutual fate control game Selten’s directional learning theory reduces to the win -stay lose-
change strategy.  
17 The detailed analysis runs as follows: for each player participating in a non -converging pair we use the 
binomial test to determine whether the loose-change decision is (to the 5%-level) significantly lower or higher 
than 0.5. For those players showing significance we find that 7 players change less often than 0.5 and 2 players 
change more often than 0.5. According to the binomial test this distribution is (to the 5% -level) significantly 
biased towards lower frequencies than 0.5.    19
Looking at the data for each strategy separately, we see that, ironically, a confirmatory 
record for strategy A causes subjects to stay with larger probability than a confirmatory record 
does for strategy B. We have no account for this observation. The sudden drop of the rate of 
staying when the record is full at strategy B is due to few observations
18.  
The discouraging results from  Table  4 stand in sharp contrast to results from earlier 
studies in which the win -stay lose-change strategy has been put forward to account for 
observed behaviour.  Rabinowitz et al.  (1966) showed that in their experiment as time 
proceeds subjects increasingly accord to the win-stay lose-change strategy. We recalculated 
their table 2 with our own data and found no such adjustment behaviour
19.  
    rounds 
tendency  response  2 - 50  51 – 100 
win-stay  both  0.62  0.57 
lose-change  both  0.42  0.38 
win-stay  A  0.68  0.63 
win-stay  B  0.55  0.52 
lose-change  A  0.39  0.38 
lose-change  B  0.47  0.38 
Table 5: rates of accordance to win-stay lose-change strategy 
(averages over all subjects in non-coordinating pairs) 
In fact, rather the opposite can be found. All categories show a downward trend from the 
first half to the second half of the experiment, though some trends are only small in size. We 
may, hence, conclude that gradual adjustment to the win -stay lose-change strategy can neither 
be observed. However, we  have no account for the general trend to move away from both the 
win-stay part and the lose-change part of the strategy.  
Using maximum -likelihood estimation we calculated the best fitting parameters for both 
learning schemes. We did separate analyses for  the full set of pairs and for the set of pairs that 
do not converge because ad hoc there is no reason why the learning schemes should only be 
applied to predict non-converging pairs. We estimated the learning schemes over all 100 
rounds.  




pB(1) = 1 
pA(1) = 
pB(1)  None  pA(1) = 
pB(1) = 1 
pA(1) = 
pB(1)  None 
pA(1)      1.53      8.32 
pB(1)    1.97  2.43    6.92  7.50 
j  0.984  0.976  0.977  1.0025  0.984  0.983 
-2 LL  3361.94  3345.85  3328.49  2688.48  2626.18  2625.04 
Table 6: maximum-likelihood estimation for reinforcement learning 
                                                        
18 A detailed table on an individual level is given in Appendix  7.3.  
19 In actual fact, the evidence of Rabinowitz et al.’s table 2 in favour of the win -stay lose-change strategy is 
rather weak and mainly concerns the win -stay part.    20
  all pairs  non-converging pairs 
  m = 1  m = 2  m = 3  m = 4  m = 1  m = 2  m = 3  m = 4 
X   0.83  0.84  0.90  0.92  0.64  0.60  0.60  0.57 
-2LL  3732.34  3798.85  3697.68  3657.80  2707.34  2746.49  2759.58  2768.66 
Table 7: maximum likelihood estimation for experimentation learning 
The analysis shows for the reinforcement learning scheme that taking all pairs into 
account we get results very close to our initial assumptions, i.e. pA(1) and pB(1) at 
approximately 1 and  j very near 1, allowing for only 2 to 2.5% forgetting. Exclusion of the 
converging pairs yields similar values for  j but much higher values for the initialisation 
parameters. This is plausible since higher  initial propensities mean more variation of play. 
Consequently, fixing the initial parameter at 1 yields an implausible value for  j
20. Not 
surprisingly, if considering all pairs fixing the initial propensities to be equal yields a 
significant loss of expla natory power. The propensity of B naturally is much larger than the 
one of A. Interestingly, when excluding the converging pairs this restriction does not have a 
significant impact. This is one more piece of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that those 
subjects who do not coordinate with their partners have no systematic tendency towards either 
of the actions.  
For the experimentation learning we first find that when excluding the converging pairs 
m = 1 again fits the data best. The small values for x in dicate that the win-stay part of the 
strategy is not very pronounced. Considering all pairs, values for x are naturally much higher 
since at the point of convergence the win-stay part is fully met. As for the performance, it 
might seem surprising that m =  4 is best and most probably higher values for m would yield 
even better results. The reason is simply that because of the value for x being predicted much 
higher those strategies perform better which allow for more random play in pairs that do not 
converge.  
A comparison between the two learning schemes shows that we can add our study to the 
list of those that favour reinforcement learning. In order to put the comparison on equal 
footing we compare the best likelihood value from the experimentation learning  scheme with 
the likelihood value for the one-parameter reinforcement model. This shows that for both 
categories the reinforcement model performs much better than the experimentation learning 
scheme. This is so, even though the experimentation learning sch eme has the advantage of 
one more discrete variable (namely m). However, we have to point out that qualitative 
features force us to say that none of the algorithms does a particularly good job.  
                                                        
20 j > 1 means that experience further in the past have a stronger impact on current action than recent 
experiences.    21
4.2  Game space 
One may argue that, since people do not know which game they are actually going to 
play, they will simply imagine one and start playing according to that game. However, this 
does not cause trouble to our interpretations of subjects’ play, because, given subjects’ prior 
information, there are only four gam es that can possibly be played. In particular, if one writes 
down all 256 possible 2x2 games resulting from payoffs that can take either value 0 or 1 and 
subsequently eliminates all games that are either trivial or involve a dominant strategy for at 
least one player, then you are left with one of the following games: (i) the matching pennies 
game, (ii) the symmetric coordination game, (iii) our mutual fate control game, or (iv) fate 
control – behaviour control
21, in which, for one player, giving is identifie d with one strategy 
and the other player’s giving strategy depends on the strategy chosen by the first player. For 
all cases experimentation learning eventually leads either to the unique mixed -strategy Nash-
equilibrium or to an outcome that maximizes both , individual as well as joint payoffs.   
Furthermore, the only game not containing the prospect of eventual coordination is the 
game of matching pennies
22. Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) already conducted this game 
under little information and found little evi dence for deliberate mixing behaviour. We 
investigated whether subjects in our experiment exhibited similar patterns of behaviour.   
We first checked for the consistency of mixing between the two strategies. Assuming 
that, in the first periods, people learn  about their environment and, after a sufficient amount of 
time, they converge to a more or less stable mixed strategy, we expect to observe a mix of 
strategies that conforms to an i.i.d. play. Taking the observed rate of occurrence of strategy B 
to be the approximation to the probability of playing B, one can conduct a Wald -Wolfowitz 
One-Sample Runs test to check whether the number of runs (i.e. the number of sequences in 
which the same strategy has been played) is similar to the expected number of runs un der the 
i.i.d. hypothesis. We perform this test for the last 40 rounds of each player and exclude 
players of pairs that do coordinate. The results are shown in  Table 8.  
                                                        
21 For a more detailed description of fate control – behaviour control, see e.g. Arickx and van Avermaet (1981).  
22 Note that the crucial difference in  dynamics between mutual fate control and matching pennies lies in the 
impact of opponent’s play. In matching pennies the opponent’s action determines  which of my own strategies is 
vindicated and which is refuted, while in mutual fate control the opponent’ s action determines whether my 
currently active strategy is vindicated or refuted.    22
 






p-value   
1  22  27  20,80  0,05 * 
2  23  19  20,55  0,63   
7  33  15  12,55  0,30   
8  20  40  21,00  0,00 ** 
9  21  19  20,95  0,63   
10  21  20  20,95  0,88   
11  18  11  20,80  0,00 ** 
12  19  19  20,95  0,63   
13  3  3  6,55  0,00 ** 
14  19  7  20,95  0,00 ** 
15  13  19  18,55  1,00   
16  11  14  16,95  0,30   
21  18  17  20,80  0,26   
22  21  26  20,95  0,11   
23  2  3  4,80  0,05 * 
24  17  11  20,55  0,00 ** 
27  21  27  20,95  0,04 ** 
28  16  8  20,20  1,00  
29  22  13  20,80  1,00  
30  32  9  13,80  0,99  
Table 8: Wald-Wolfowotz One-Sample Runs test for last 40 periods 
(* 10% significance, ** 5% significance) 
As can be seen, for 8 out of 20 subjects the i.i.d. hypothesis can be rejected to the 10%-
level. For the 5%-level the number of rejections is still 6 out of 20. This is in line with what 
Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) have found for their low-information treatment. In our study 5 
out of 8 rejections are based on too few runs, which is not an immediate indicator for some 
sort of inertia in subject’s play. But, two of the rejections that are caused by too many runs 
(players 8 and 27) are due to the players obviously alternating between the two strategies. For 
further analysis of inertia in subject’s play we have to look at the individual dynamics.   
For this purpose we follow Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) and adopt the concept of 
vindication of strategies, which has first been used for the definition of basic routine learning 
schemes by Bush and Mosteller (1955). According to them, a strategy is vindicated whenever 
either, it has been chosen and yielded a success , or, the alternative strategy has been chosen 
and yielded a failure. For the following, we denote the strategy chosen by player i at time t 
again by a
i(t) and the resulting payoff by p
i(t). The vindication of player i’s strategy 1 will be 
denoted by v
i(t), thus,  
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We use a logistic regression to analyse the impact of own lagged actions and lagged 
vindication of strategy B (up to four periods before the current period) on the probability to   23
choose strategy B, the rewarding strategy. Table 9 shows the coefficients of the respective 
regressands and the corresponding p-values. We excluded groups that eventually co-ordinate 
on the efficient outcome.  
  coefficient  p-value 
constant  -1.26  0.00 
a(t-1)  0.80  0.00 
a(t-2)  0.52  0.00 
a(t-3)  -0.27  0.01 
a(t-4)  0.69  0.00 
v(t-1)  0.04  0.73 
v(t-2)  0.31  0.00 
v(t-3)  -0.37  0.00 
v(t-4)  0.57  0.00 
Table 9: logistic regression on probability of choosing strategy B for last 40 rounds 
(n = 1920, c²(8) = 198.74, p = 0.00) 
Large positive coefficients and strong significance for the one - and two-period lagged 
own choices signify a strong tendency towards inertia. However, three-lagged own choices 
are significantly negative. Furthermore, vindication is not i mmediately responded to as can be 
seen from the insignificant coefficient for the one -period lagged vindication. Former 
vindication, however, does have a significant impact, though with alternating sign. We 
conclude that subjects exhibit a significant amou nt of inertia and respond volatile to the 
vindication of the rewarding strategy. We find positive auto -correlation of subject’s choices. 
In this respect behaviour differs from mainly negatively auto -correlated choices in the 
matching-pennies game. However, the volatile response to vindication is a similarity found in 
both games under low information conditions. Neither reinforcement learning nor 
experimentation learning can account for this latter observation.   
4.3  Individual patterns 
Under little information i t is likely that subjects exhibit varying strategies in order to 
explore their environment. Furthermore, the task looks similar to playing a two -armed bandit, 
so it is likely that subjects use individual exploration strategies before playing a certain acti on. 
As noted earlier, some of the subjects deliberately chose to play certain patterns. In the 
following table we give an overview of broad characteristics of the subjects.  
player  Characteristic 
1  alternating play in rounds 11 to 48 and 50 to 73  
2  some long sequences of the same strategy until round 45, no pattern thereafter  
3  co-ordination starting in round 2  
4  co-ordination starting in round 2  
5  alternating play in rounds 32 to 45, co -ordination starting in round 65    24
6  co-ordination starting in roun d 65 
7  many long sequences of the same strategy, in later rounds more sequences of Bs  
8  sequence of As in rounds 6 to 30, alternating play from round 46 onwards  
9  no specific pattern 
10  a few short sequences of small patterns like (AABBAA) or (ABA) 
11  some long sequences of the same strategy at the beginning and towards the end, alternating 
play in rounds 46 to 60 
12  no specific pattern 
13  very long sequences of the same strategy at the beginning and during the whole second half, 
alternating play in  rounds 18 to 40 
14  many long sequences of the same strategy throughout 
15  less changes than predicted by independent draws, though no specific pattern  
16  one larger sequence of As towards the end, otherwise no specific pattern 
17  co-ordination starting at round 4 
18  co-ordination starting at round 4  
19  co-ordination starting at round 2  
20  co-ordination starting at round 2, deviation in the last 2 rounds  
21  less changes than predicted by independent draws, though no specific pattern, more changes 
towards the end 
22  no specific pattern 
23  almost always As 
24  many long sequences of the same strategy 
25  coordination starting in round 2  
26  coordination starting in round 2  
27  less changes than predicted by independent draws, though no specific patter n, more changes 
towards the end 
28  many long sequences of the same strategy 
29  no specific pattern 
30  some alternation patterns in the intermediate term, rather long sequences towards the end  
31  no pattern at the beginning, almost always Bs starting in  round 53 
32  no pattern at the beginning, almost always Bs starting in round 53  
33  coordination starting in round 9  
34  coordination starting in round 9  
Table 10: Characteristics of subjects’ play 
As can be seen from Table 10, only 4 out of the 20 subjects that do not succeed in co-
ordinating with their partner do not show any sign of inertia or a deliberate application of a 
dynamic pattern. By the use of these patterns, subjects obviously try to check out their 
environment. The most popular patterns are long sequences of the same strategy (10 subjects) 
and the alternation between the two strategies (6 subjects). There is very little evidence in   25
favour of gradual adjustment towards strategy B. Only one subject (player 7) can be 
categorised into this class. Players 31 and 32 (constituting the converging pair 16) rather 
suddenly switch to almost always play B.  
Most striking is the persistent play of strategy A by player 23. This subject obviously was 
not willing to deviate from his favourite action even after long sequences of non -rewarding 
feedback. Only twice he felt driven to play action B for two times before falling back to play 
A. In the questionnaires, that were handed out after the completion of the 1 00 rounds and 
before subjects were paid off, this subject wrote: “Although I always tried to choose the same 
strategy I did not reach to always get a payoff of 1; possibly because the other [player] 
misinterpreted the situation and chose this and that.” Th e remark clearly indicates that this 
person had a pure coordination game in mind and did not think of any other possible payoff 
scheme. In fact, 5 out of the 20 subjects that did not coordinate with their partner stated that 
they had the impression they were playing a coordination game. Most of the remaining 15 
players stated that they did not have any clue as to what the payoff matrix must have looked 
like or indicated a repeating multi -period scheme that should have given them the desired 
payoff of 1, despite our care to indicate in the instruction sheet that payoffs only depended on 
the decisions of the stage game. Several subjects also indicated that by using certain patterns 
they tried to explore the payoff environment and the way the opponent was playi ng.  
It seems that within an environment with little information subjects are tempted to believe 
they are involved in a single -person experiment or to focus on a coordination task. However, 
none of these believes justifies the renunciation of the experimen tation learning scheme.   
5. Conclusion 
The present experiment was designed to explore learning behaviour under little 
information. Subjects were not given the full payoff matrix; instead they were given the 
amount of information that is just sufficient to per form simple adaptive learning. The game 
played was mutual fate control where each of the players decides upon giving reward to the 
opponent or not. Two intuitively plausible learning schemes are presented which make 
distinct qualitative predictions. The re inforcement model predicts that people slowly adjust 
propensities, and, after a large number of periods, profiles converge to any of a diffuse set of 
possible profiles. To the contrary, the experimentation learning makes the strong prediction 
that people will exhibit some random behaviour at the beginning of the game and, with high 
probability, pairs will converge to the efficient outcome within a limited amount of time.   
The observations stand in sharp contrast to results from previous studies of this game  that 
have mainly been run by psychologists. Little coordination can be observed, and convergence   26
appears to be triggered by extreme chance events. Moreover, compliance to simple dynamics, 
such as the win-stay lose-change scheme, cannot be found. Our impre ssion is that even the 
simultaneous-move environment that Kelley et al. (1962) consider as particularly favourable 
for coordination is still not sufficient to really enforce this learning dynamic. There are two 
events that have to coincide in order to trigger coordination. First, both players have to choose 
B simultaneously, and second, none of the players deviates in the next interaction. If one 
player deviates, an immediate vindication of A follows. Without a device that coordinates 
timing this task seems  to be difficult to accomplish. Furthermore, the more flexible 
experimentation learning scheme leads to the desired result only if one may expect the partner 
to accord to this dynamic, too. As we have seen from the data, there is good reason for 
subjects to doubt this.  
Generally, the results are unfavourable for all learning schemes presented so far. 
Convergence to the efficient outcome is much slower than can reasonably be traced by the 
experimentation learning scheme. The basic win -stay lose-change scheme is not accorded to, 
either. Furthermore, subjects do not show any sign of slow adjustment behaviour. Rather, 
subjects seem to follow an exploratory scheme, much in the way Kalai and Lehrer (1995) 
describe it by using the concept of the environment respon se function. Subjects use different 
multi-period patterns in order to explore the response of their individual environment. 
However, Table 10 clearly shows that they obviously do not conform to any simple dynamics 
and stick to complex exploration schemes even if they do not lead to a significant 
improvement in payoff. Hence, mutual fate control provides an environment, in which 
subjects’ behaviour is more complex than it should be. Such behaviour results in avoidable 
inefficiencies .  
The findings of this study pose new questions that should be addressed in future research. 
First, we have seen that to withhold any information on the payoff scheme generally deprives 
subjects of the ability to systematically coordinate on the efficient  cell, even though, 
theoretically, there exists a simple learning scheme that does the job. Had subjects known the 
payoff matrix, without doubt they would have coordinated instantly. Hence, there must be a 
certain amount of information in -between that just suffices for people to coordinate. Which 
one, is still an open question. Second, more research is needed to successfully describe how 
individuals explore their environment. This experiment supports the view that individuals do 
not simply update propensities of choices, they rather combine experimentation with some 
heuristics in order to explore the environment. Only recently, there have some attempts been 
made to capture exploration behaviour. Most notably is the concept of the environment   27
response function by Kalai and Lehrer (1995). They argue that in low -information settings 
people tend to consider their feedback as a composite of the whole environment they are 
acting in. Unfortunately, the authors do not specify the way subjects may perform their 
updating of the response function. It is a future task to use this theory to broaden the set of 
empirically supported learning rules.   
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7. Appendices 
 
7.1   Instructions  
 
Preliminaries: 
You are participating in a study on decision making within the framework of experimental 
economics. After you have read these instructions we will come to you in order to clarify 
open questions. If you encounter any further questions during play please raise your hand, so 
a member of the staff can come to you.  
Please do not touch the computer until you are asked to start the game. Tips on the usage of 
the computer are given on the back page.  
During the session you will face a sequence of decision tasks. At each decision you may earn 
money. How much money you will get depends on your decisions. The aggregated payoff 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experi ment. Your decisions as well as your payoff   30
is known only to you, that is we take care that no other participant will get any information on 
your decisions or payoffs.  
Decision task:  
You are one of 8 (10) persons. All persons are faced with the same task, that is, all persons 
have got identical instruction sheets and sit, separated from each other, in front of a computer 
terminal.  
Before the start of the first round, all 8 (10) persons are matched randomly into four (five) 
pairs. The pairs remain fixed t hroughout the whole session, that is, the person you are playing 
with will be the same throughout the whole session. You will never be told whom you are 
paired with.  
Soon, you will be required to make the following identical decision in 100 successive rou nds:  
In each round you have got the choice between two alternatives: action A and action B. After 
you and the person you are paired with have entered the decisions upon your choice the 
computer will calculate your payoff according to a predetermined schem e and subsequently 
informs you about your payoff.  
Payoff scheme: 
The payoff scheme will not be made public. What is known is that the payoffs within your 
pair solely depend on your decision and the decision of your opponent of that round. 
Particularly, no random process will be used to calculate payoffs. Furthermore, it is known 
that payoffs can take either of the values, 0 or 1, where 0 is equivalent to 0 DM and 1 is 
equivalent to 0.30 DM.  
Your MAXLAB team 
Tips for the usage of the computer: 
1.  Please do not touch the computer until you are asked to start the play.  
2.  Please do not start any other programs during the experimental session.   
3.  You can enter your decision by clicking with your mouse on one of the two buttons, A or 
B. After that, a window appears that asks you to confirm your choice.  
4.  After confirming your choice, please wait until the information on the last round appears 
before you go on with the next round.  
5.  In case there are any technical problems with the usage of the program, please 
immediately inform a member of the staff by raising your hand.   
7.2  Data 
   31
round pair 1pair 2 pair 3pair 4pair 5 pair 6pair 7pair 8 pair 9pair 10 pair 11 pair 12pair 13 pair 14 pair 15pair 16 pair 17 
player  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34 
1  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  B  A  B 
2  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B 
3  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B 
4  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B 
5  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B 
6  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B 
7  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A 
8  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  A 
9  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B 
10  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B 
11  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B 
12  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B 
13  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
14  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  A  B  B 
15  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  A  B  B 
16  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B 
17  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B 
18  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B 
19  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B 
20  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
21  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B 
22  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
23  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
24  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  B 
25  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B 
26  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B 
27  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B 
28  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B 
29  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B 
30  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B 
31  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
32  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
33  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B 
34  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B 
35  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
36  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B 
37  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
38  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
39  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B 
40  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  A  B  B 
41  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
42  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
43  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B 
44  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  B  B 
45  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B 
46  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B 
47  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B 
48  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B 
49  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B 
50  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
51  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  B 
52  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B 
53  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B 
54  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B 
55  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B 
56  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
57  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
58  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
59  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
60  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
61  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B 
62  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
63  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B 
64  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B 
65  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
66  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
67  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
68  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
69  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
70  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
71  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B 
72  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B 
73  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B 
74  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B 
75  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
76  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
77  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
78  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B 
79  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
80  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B 
81  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  B 
82  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
83  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
84  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  B  B  B 
85  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B 
86  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B 
87  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B 
88  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
89  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
90  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B 
91  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B 
92  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B 
93  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  B  B 
94  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B 
95  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
96  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B 
97  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  A  B  B  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
98  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B  B  B  B 
99  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  A  A  B  B  A  B  B  B 
100  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  A  B  A  A  B  A  B  B  B  B  A  A  A  A  A  B  B  B  B  B  B  A  B  B  B 
   32
7.3  Accordance to experimentation learning 
   m=1 
player FSA  FA  FSArate FSB  FB  FSBrate  FS  F  FSrate ACA  AA  ACArate ACB  AB  ACBrate AC  A  ACrate 
1  5 27 0,19 7 32 0,22  12 59 0,20  16 21 0,76 13 19 0,68 29 40 0,73 
2  9 19 0,47 20 32 0,63  29 51 0,57  12 21 0,57 9 27 0,33 21 48 0,44 
7  8 8 1,00 17 27 0,63  25 35 0,71  15 34 0,44 5 30 0,17 20 64 0,31 
8  14 30 0,47 0 27 0,00  14 57 0,25  15 34 0,44 4 8 0,50 19 42 0,45 
9  10 23 0,43 11 24 0,46  21 47 0,45  12 25 0,48 12 27 0,44 24 52 0,46 
10  16 27 0,59 13 24 0,54  29 51 0,57  16 25 0,64 16 23 0,70 32 48 0,67 
11  17 25 0,68 18 25 0,72  35 50 0,70  10 23 0,43 11 26 0,42 21 49 0,43 
12  17 26 0,65 14 25 0,56  31 51 0,61  11 23 0,48 10 25 0,40 21 48 0,44 
13  23 27 0,85 0 4 0,00  23 31 0,74  13 45 0,29 13 23 0,57 26 68 0,38 
14  22 23 0,96 2 4 0,50  24 27 0,89  8 45 0,18 6 27 0,22 14 72 0,19 
15  19 25 0,76 13 17 0,76  32 42 0,76  13 30 0,43 16 27 0,59 29 57 0,51 
16  16 27 0,59 12 17 0,71  28 44 0,64  10 30 0,33 15 25 0,60 25 55 0,45 
21  18 30 0,60 13 21 0,62  31 51 0,61  6 26 0,23 10 22 0,45 16 48 0,33 
22  7 22 0,32 5 21 0,24  12 43 0,28  14 26 0,54 13 30 0,43 27 56 0,48 
23  49 49 1,00 0 0   49 49 1,00  2 46 0,04 2 4 0,50 4 50 0,08 
24  4 4 1,00 0 0   4 4 1,00  16 46 0,35 16 49 0,33 32 95 0,34 
27  8 18 0,44 5 13 0,38  13 31 0,42  10 29 0,34 12 39 0,31 22 68 0,32 
28  36 39 0,92 9 13 0,69  45 52 0,87  12 29 0,41 10 18 0,56 22 47 0,47 
29  18 29 0,62 26 37 0,70  44 66 0,67  6 19 0,32 6 14 0,43 12 33 0,36 
30  5 14 0,36 27 37 0,73  32 51 0,63  12 19 0,63 10 29 0,34 22 48 0,46 
mean 16,0524,60 0,6510,6020,00 0,47 26,6544,60 0,63 11,4529,80 0,4210,4524,60 0,4521,9054,40 0,42 
 
   m=2 
player FSA FA  FSArateFSB FB  FSBrate FS  F  FSrate ACA  AA  ACArate ACB  AB  ACBrate  AC  A  ACrate 
1  1 14 0,07 4 20 0,20 5 34 0,15  25 34 0,74 22 31 0,71  47 65 0,72 
2  5 9 0,56 7 12 0,58 12 21 0,57  18 31 0,58 16 47 0,34  34 78 0,44 
7  4 4 1,00 9 10 0,90 13 14 0,93  15 38 0,39 14 47 0,30  29 85 0,34 
8  9 16 0,56 0 26 0,00 9 42 0,21  24 48 0,50 5 9 0,56  29 57 0,51 
9  4 8 0,50 5 12 0,42 9 20 0,45  21 40 0,53 18 39 0,46  39 79 0,49 
10  8 15 0,53 5 10 0,50 13 25 0,52  20 37 0,54 22 37 0,59  42 74 0,57 
11  9 15 0,60 10 13 0,77 19 28 0,68  12 33 0,36 15 38 0,39  27 71 0,38 
12  10 15 0,67 5 13 0,38 15 28 0,54  15 34 0,44 13 37 0,35  28 71 0,39 
13  18 20 0,90 0 0   18 20 0,90  15 52 0,29 17 27 0,63  32 79 0,41 
14  10 10 1,00 1 1 1,00 11 11 1,00  9 58 0,16 8 30 0,27  17 88 0,19 
15  8 13 0,62 5 8 0,63 13 21 0,62  14 42 0,33 17 36 0,47  31 78 0,40 
16  9 12 0,75 7 9 0,78 16 21 0,76  18 45 0,40 18 33 0,55  36 78 0,46 
21  10 17 0,59 4 8 0,50 14 25 0,56  11 39 0,28 14 35 0,40  25 74 0,34 
22  4 12 0,33 1 8 0,13 5 20 0,25  21 36 0,58 22 43 0,51  43 79 0,54 
23  33 33 1,00 0 0   33 33 1,00  2 62 0,03 2 4 0,50  4 66 0,06 
24  2 2 1,00 0 0   2 2 1,00  16 48 0,33 16 49 0,33  32 97 0,33 
27  2 7 0,29 2 7 0,29 4 14 0,29  15 40 0,38 15 45 0,33  30 85 0,35 
28  24 26 0,92 2 5 0,40 26 31 0,84  13 42 0,31 11 26 0,42  24 68 0,35 
29  10 16 0,63 18 26 0,69 28 42 0,67  11 32 0,34 9 25 0,36  20 57 0,35 
30  2 5 0,40 15 22 0,68 17 27 0,63  18 28 0,64 13 44 0,30  31 72 0,43 
 mean9,1013,45 0,655,0010,50 0,5214,1023,95 0,63 15,6540,95 0,4114,3534,10 0,44 30,0075,05 0,40 
 
   m=3 
player FSA FA  FSArateFSB FB  FSBrate  FS  F  FSrate ACA  AA  ACArate ACB  AB  ACBrate AC  A  ACrate 
1  0 6 0,00 0 12 0,00  0 18 0,00  32 42 0,76 26 39 0,67 58 81 0,72 
2  2 2 1,00 1 4 0,25  3 6 0,50  22 38 0,58 18 55 0,33 40 93 0,43 
7  0 0   1 1 1,00  1 1 1,00  15 42 0,36 15 56 0,27 30 98 0,31 
8  6 8 0,75 0 25 0,00  6 33 0,18  29 56 0,52 6 10 0,60 35 66 0,53 
9  0 2 0,00 3 4 0,75  3 6 0,50  23 46 0,50 24 47 0,51 47 93 0,51 
10  3 7 0,43 1 2 0,50  4 9 0,44  23 45 0,51 26 45 0,58 49 90 0,54 
11  4 8 0,50 3 4 0,75  7 12 0,58  14 40 0,35 17 47 0,36 31 87 0,36 
12  7 8 0,88 2 6 0,33  9 14 0,64  19 41 0,46 17 44 0,39 36 85 0,42 
13  13 14 0,93 0 0   13 14 0,93  16 58 0,28 17 27 0,63 33 85 0,39 
14  5 5 1,00 0 0   5 5 1,00  9 63 0,14 8 31 0,26 17 94 0,18 
15  3 6 0,50 0 3 0,00  3 9 0,33  16 49 0,33 17 41 0,41 33 90 0,37 
16  2 4 0,50 5 5 1,00  7 9 0,78  19 53 0,36 20 37 0,54 39 90 0,43 
21  7 10 0,70 2 3 0,67  9 13 0,69  15 46 0,33 17 40 0,43 32 86 0,37 
22  1 5 0,20 0 1 0,00  1 6 0,17  25 43 0,58 28 50 0,56 53 93 0,57 
23  21 21 1,00 0 0   21 21 1,00  2 74 0,03 2 4 0,50 4 78 0,05 
24  0 0   0 0   0 0   16 50 0,32 16 49 0,33 32 99 0,32 
27  0 3 0,00 0 2 0,00  0 5 0,00  17 44 0,39 18 50 0,36 35 94 0,37 
28  14 16 0,88 2 4 0,50  16 20 0,80  13 52 0,25 12 27 0,44 25 79 0,32 
29  5 8 0,63 13 18 0,72  18 26 0,69  14 40 0,35 12 33 0,36 26 73 0,36 
30  1 1 1,00 7 11 0,64  8 12 0,67  21 32 0,66 16 55 0,29 37 87 0,43 
 mean4,706,70 0,602,005,25 0,44 6,7011,95 0,57 18,0047,70 0,4016,6039,35 0,4434,6087,05 0,40 
 
   m=4 
player FSA FA  FSArateFSB FB  FSBrate FS  F  FSrate ACA  AA  ACArate ACB  AB  ACBrate  AC  A  ACrate 
1  0 3 0,00 0 9 0,00 0 12 0,00  35 45 0,78 29 42 0,69  64 87 0,74 
2  0 0   0 2 0,00 0 2 0,00  22 40 0,55 19 57 0,33  41 97 0,42 
7  0 0   0 0   0 0   15 42 0,36 15 57 0,26  30 99 0,30 
8  4 4 1,00 0 24 0,00 4 28 0,14  31 60 0,52 7 11 0,64  38 71 0,54 
9  0 0   1 2 0,50 1 2 0,50  25 48 0,52 24 49 0,49  49 97 0,51 
10  1 3 0,33 0 0   1 3 0,33  25 49 0,51 27 47 0,57  52 96 0,54 
11  2 5 0,40 0 0   2 5 0,40  15 43 0,35 18 51 0,35  33 94 0,35 
12  2 2 1,00 1 2 0,50 3 4 0,75  20 47 0,43 20 48 0,42  40 95 0,42 
13  9 10 0,90 0 0   9 10 0,90  16 62 0,26 17 27 0,63  33 89 0,37 
14  2 2 1,00 0 0   2 2 1,00  9 66 0,14 8 31 0,26  17 97 0,18 
15  2 2 1,00 0 0   2 2 1,00  19 53 0,36 20 44 0,45  39 97 0,40 
16  0 0   2 2 1,00 2 2 1,00  21 57 0,37 20 40 0,50  41 97 0,42 
21  3 5 0,60 0 1 0,00 3 6 0,50  16 51 0,31 17 42 0,40  33 93 0,35 
22  0 2 0,00 0 0   0 2 0,00  27 46 0,59 29 51 0,57  56 97 0,58 
23  13 13 1,00 0 0   13 13 1,00  2 82 0,02 2 4 0,50  4 86 0,05 
24  0 0   0 0   0 0   16 50 0,32 16 49 0,33  32 99 0,32 
27  0 1 0,00 0 1 0,00 0 2 0,00  19 46 0,41 19 51 0,37  38 97 0,39 
28  10 11 0,91 1 3 0,33 11 14 0,79  14 57 0,25 12 28 0,43  26 85 0,31 
29  3 6 0,50 10 14 0,71 13 20 0,65  14 42 0,33 13 37 0,35  27 79 0,34 
30  0 0   3 4 0,75 3 4 0,75  21 33 0,64 19 62 0,31  40 95 0,42 
 mean2,553,45 0,620,903,20 0,293,456,65 0,54 19,1050,95 0,4017,5541,40 0,44 36,6592,35 0,40 
   33
F denotes “full record” 
A denotes “ambiguous record” 
S denotes “stay” 
C denotes “change” 
A, B denote strategy A and strategy B, respectively 
 